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Professor Law "discusses the political and ethical questions that
confront lawyers and judges in deciding whether to use arguments they
believe to be generally wrong to support particular causes and
litigants."' She argues that "while the Court's dramatic new federalism
is profoundly disturbing, reliance [by liberals] upon its rules in particular
cases is not."2
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Bush v. Gore, 3 as contrasted
with its prior decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,4 suggests that the
conservatives, but not the liberals, on the Supreme Court have heeded
her message that one can and should rely on arguments with which one
disagrees philosophically. In Bush v. Gore, the five conservative members
of the Court found an equal protection violation whereas the four
liberals dissented. The conservative members of the Court, however,
were very careful to write an opinion that would not extend beyond the
immediate Presidential election controversy to other cases involving
more traditional claims of equal protection violations brought on behalf
of minority voters. By contrast, in City ofBoerne, two liberal members of
the Court, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, joined four conservative
members of the Court to rule that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)6 was unconstitutional as applied to the states because. it
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1. Sylvia A. Law, In the Name ofFederalism The Supreme Cour's Assault on Democracy and Ciil Rights, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 372 (2002).
2. Id.
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. "Out consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection
in election processes generally presents many complexities." Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. The concurring
opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, which wasjoined byJustices Scalia and Thomas, offered even stronger
language to limit the holding to the facts of the Gore decision. They recognized that "[i]n most cases,
comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law."
Id. at 112. But they also noted: "We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an election for the
President of the United States." Id.
6. The statute at issue in i! of Boerne was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
"[RFRA] sailed through both houses of Congress, passing unanimously in the House of Representatives
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exceeded Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 The liberal members of the Court, however, did not
attempt to write narrow language to confine the decision to its facts;
instead, they joined language which is otherwise inconsistent with the
understanding that Section 5 extends broad authority to Congress to
enact civil rights legislation.8 That language laid the seeds for a
narrower conception of Congress's authority under Section 5 to enact
civil rights legislation.' I will argue that liberals need to learn to craft
arguments to strike down conservative legislation" which, if possible,
and drawing only three votes in opposition in the Senate." Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
I y the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. RE'. 437,438 (1994).
7. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
8. The City of Boerne Court disavowed the language in Iatzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),
"which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the
tights contained in § I of the Fourteenth Amendment." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28. In addition, it
crafted a "congruence and proportionality" test that had never been mentioned in previous Section 5 cases.
See id. at 533. Finally, the decision in City ofBoerne failed to build on the "ratchet up" theory articulated by
the Court in Katzenbach which had been used to explain why Congress could expand but not dilute Section
I rights through its Section 5 enforcement authority. See Kat.zenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n. 10 (1966).
9. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (holding that Age Discrimination in
Employment Act did not validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity). Justice Stevens authored a dissent
in / rnel that was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id.
10. As bipartisan legislation, I recognize that it is not fair to describe RFRA as "conservative"
legislation. The impetus to enact RFRA, however, came from religious organizations rather than civil
rights organizations. For example, the initial testimony in support of RFRA was received from the
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, National Association of Evangelicals, National Council of
Churches, The AmericanJewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League as well as from the People for
the American Way Action Fund. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the jud'iay, 101stCong. 26-60 (1990). Hence, RFRA
is not the traditional, liberal civil rights legislation which has been enacted pursuant to Section 5. Many
of the organizations that supported RFRA might support the protection of religious exercise beyond the
boundaries set by the Establishment Clause because their interest is in protecting the religious exercise of
their members rather than defending the Constitution. A key exception to this pattern is that the ACLU
supported RFRA although it does not appear to have been a leading proponent of the legislation.
The ACLU's position on RFRA is baffling given its "tendency to advocate highly secularist and
separationist readings of the First Amendment." Scott C. Idleman, 77Te Religious Freedom Restoration Act.-
Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 300 n.290 (1994). In fact, "the ACLU
spearheaded the unsuccessful challenge to § 702 of Title VII, which accommodates the hiring needs of
religious employers, in part because that provision, like RFRA, exceeded the requirements of the Free
Exercise Clause ... and preferentially discriminated pursuant to the criterion of religious identity." Id.
Although the ACLU did not testify at the first hearing on RFRA, Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU's
National Board of Directors, did testify at later House and Senate hearings that RFRA was constitutional.
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civtil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 102d Cong. 63 (1992); lTe Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings
on S. 2969 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 171 (1992)t The ACLU, however, did not write an
amicus brief on the constitutionality of RFRA for the Supreme Court. Thus, I suspect its support for
RFRA was soft.
Any doubt about whether RFRA was, in fact, conservative legislation can be resolved by
examining how it has been used. Conservative religious groups have attempted to use it to avoid
compliance with sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws.
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will not jeopardize their own legislative agenda. I will argue that RFRA
should have been struck down on much narrower grounds, either by a
finding that Congress exceeded its authority under Marbuy v. Madison"
or that it violated the special rules that apply when it seeks to use Section
5 to enforce the Free Exercise Clause.' 2 The Establishment Clause acts
as a unique ceiling to Congress's authority to use Section 5; that unique
ceiling does not apply outside the religious exercise context. This
revisionist understanding of why RFRA was unconstitutional would not
jeopardize Congress's authority to use Section 5 to enact civil rights
legislation. "
Like the Commerce Clause, 4 Section 5 is a part of the Constitution
that empowers Congress to enact legislation. Congress can use that
authority to enact legislation to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 13 In light of the decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,6
Congress must use Section 5 when it desires to enact legislation which
provides for a private damages remedy against state actors. It also
occasionally uses Section 5 to justify legislation to enforce Section 1 even
when the remedy does not constitute a private damages remedy against
state actors.' 7 To the extent that the current Congress desires to enact
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
12. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peacably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress ofgrievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
13. 1 therefore agree with Professor Marci Hamilton, who has argued that RFRA cannot be
constitutionally applied to federal law because the Establishment Clause limits Congress when it regulates
the states or federal government. Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutiona4
Period, I U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1 (1998). Professor Hamilton was lead counsel for the City of Boerne, Texas
in City of Boerne v. Flores.
14. "The Congress shall have Power.., [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizensofthe United States and ofthe State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities ofcitizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process oflaw; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection ofthe
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 76 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity limits Congress's authority to provide private remedies against state actors when it is
acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
17. Two examples are the civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
and RFRA. In VAWA, Congress sought to justify civil remedies for the victims of gender-motivated
violence under the theory that this statute could bejustified under the Commerce Clause or Section 5. The
Supreme Court rejected the Commerce. Clausejustification pursuant to its decision in United States v. Lopez.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,617-18 (2000). The government therefore tried tojustify the
statute under Section 5 by arguing that it sought to correct the pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence. Id. at 619. In RFRA, Congress sought to require
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new legislation that seeks to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it may use Section 5 as its authority. Liberals, therefore,
need to be cautious in making Section 5 arguments to strike down
conservative legislation because they may wish to justify new or existing
legislation under Congress's Section 5 authority. Arguments used in one
setting to invalidate conservative legislation could backfire when liberals
seek to justify their own legislative agenda.
In this essay, I will argue that liberal jurists such asJustices Ginsburg
and Stevens could have found that RFRA was unconstitutional without
joining language that would potentially limit Congress's authority when
enacting civil rights legislation pursuant to Section 5. 8 Congress has
recently enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000's which suffers from many of the same flaws found in
RFRA.2 ° This new statute will give liberals a second opportunity to
challenge conservative legislation. Rather than make.arguments which
may lead to the further narrowing of Congress's Section 5 authority,
liberals can learn to make arguments that will lead to the invalidation
of this legislation without generally harming Congress's Section 5
powers.
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL CONTEXT
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in
a legal climate in which it understood itself to have broad authority to
legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The pivotal
case in defining the scope of Congress's authority prior to City of Boerne
was Katzenbach v. Morgan.2 Congress soughtto enforce Section 1 of the
governmental entities to create exceptions for neutral laws that might substantially burden religious
exercise. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Although RFRA did not provide for monetary
relief, Congress rested its authority to enact the statute on Section 5. Presumably, it could not conceive of
a plausible Commerce Clause or spending power argument for the legislation. These two examples of use
ofSection 5 by Congress are unusual. More typically, Congress uses Section 5 when it is seeking to create
a remedy for private monetary damages against state actors and, in light of Seminole Tribe, cannot offer a
Commerce Clause justification. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999) (FLSA not
constitutionally applied to the states); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 672-75 (1999) (Trademark Act not constitutionally applied to the states); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (Patent Act not
constitutionally applied to the states); Kimel %'. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act not constitutionally applied to the states).
18. Justice Ginsburg merelyjoined the majority opinion without separate comment. Ci~y ofBoene,
521 U.S. at 509. Justice Stevens joined the majority and wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 536
(Stevens,J., concurring).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
20. SeeinfaPart]IV.
21. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Fourteenth Amendment by providing that no person who has success-
fully completed the sixth primary grade in an American school in which
the predominant language is other than English shall be disqualified
from voting under any literacy test. The statute at issue in Katzenbach
invalidated certain literacy tests for voting which would have withstood
challenge under the Supreme Court's prior decision in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections.2 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
accepted the argument that Congress could strengthen the existing
constitutional norms in the voting rights area through legislation enacted
pursuant to Section 5. This power, however, only went in one direction:
Congress could "ratchet up" 3 but not "dilute" constitutional guarantees
through its Section 5 powers. 4 In addition, the Katzenbach Court noted
that Congress could not use its enforcement authority under Section 5
to violate another provision of the Constitution.25 In the voting rights
context, Congress was attempting to enhance existing rights and was not
doing so in a way that would violate any other constitutional principles.
Hence, the Voting Rights Act provision withstood constitutional
challenge. Nearly twenty years later, Congress sought to use this
Section 5 authority to enhance the accommodation protections offered
to religious entities under RFRA.
The Katzenbach decision, however, did not directly support the
enactment of RFRA for two important reasons. First, Katzenbach was
decided during an era in which the Court had a very respectful
relationship with Congress.2 6 As part of this respectful relationship, the
Court tended to defer to Congress's factfinding and conclusions. Hence,
although the factual justification for Congress's need to enforce equal
protection principles with its special literacy rule in the Voting Rights
Act was limited, the Court deferred to Congress's expertise on such
matters in the Katzenbach decision. Hindsight reveals that the Court was
becoming increasingly skeptical of Congress's expertise as reflected in its
decisions in City of Boerne v. Flores, 7 United States v. Lopez,28 Kimel v. Florida
Board ofRegents, 9 and United States v. Morrison.30 Hence, the mere fact that
22. 360 U.S. 45, 50-53 (1959).
23. For further discussion of the ratchet metaphor, see Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the
Ratchet, 56 Mow. L. REV. 145 (1995).
24. Kat.enbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. For further discussion of Section 5, see Ruth Colker, The
Section Fhue QVagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653 (2000).
25. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n. 10.
26. For further discussion of this argument, see Ruth Colker &JamesJ. Brudney, Dissing Congress,
100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001).
27. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
28. 514 U.S. 549(1995).
29. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
30. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Congress concluded that it needed to enact legislation such as RFRA to
enforce religious freedom no longer meant that the Court would defer
to Congress's judgment. Although Professor Law describes this
sequence of case law as reflecting a "new federalism,"' I would be
equally inclined to describe it as a separation of powers revival.
Congress was not aware that it needed to do more than hold a few
hearings and draft reasonable legislation to enforce Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted RFRA.
Second, Katzenbach was decided in the race relations context. Under
its holding, Congress could enforce, but not dilute, Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment through its Section 5 enforcement powers. It
also could not use this "ratchet up" authority to violate other constitu-
tional provisions. The Court has never found that this "ratchet up"
theory has any ceiling in the race relations context.32 The religious
freedom context, however, is more complicated because the Establish-
ment Clause serves as a ceiling on Congress's authority. Congress may
not provide such broad accommodation to religion that it violates the
neutrality principles reflected in the Establishment Clause.33 A careful
observer of the Court's jurisprudence in this area could see that an
attempt to mandate accommodation of religion under Section 5 could
result in the violation of the Establishment Clause.
At the time that Congress was drafting RFRA, the Court had decided
two recent Establishment Clause cases which drew into question the
authority of governmental entities to accommodate religion. In 1985,
the Supreme Court held in an 8-1 decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc."4 that a Connecticut statute which provides Sabbath observers with
an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath violates
31. See Law, supra note 1, at 372.
32. &e South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,337 (1966) (upholding provisions ofthe Voting
Rights Act under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970)
(upholding 1970 amendments to Voting Rights Act prohibiting use of literacy tests and other discriminatory
devices under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment while also finding that Congress did not have the
authority to set the voting age at eighteen in state and local elections); City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 183 (1980) (upholding provisions of the Voting Rights Act under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment). Because Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment has virtually the same enforcement language
as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case law under both sections of the Constitution is
interchangeable. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
33. The leading Case on the Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), in
which the Court announced the following test to be applied in cases involving the clause: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion."' Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)) (citation omitted).
34. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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the Establishment Clause.35 Thus, under Caldor, if Congress sought to
mandate the accommodation of religion under RFRA, it had to make
sure that it was not providing protection that might be considered akin
to "absolute protection." 6 Moreover, it needed to ensure that a neutral
observer would not conclude that a governmental entity was conveying
the message of endorsing a particular religious belief.
In a more recent opinion in Board ofEducation of Izryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet,"7 decided in 1994, the Court clarified when a govern-
ment entity's accommodation of religious beliefs will be considered to
have violated the Establishment Clause. In Grumet, the state of New
York had created a special school district following village lines so that
the village could use public funds to establish a school for children with
disabilities that would also accommodate their religious beliefs. Justice
Souter wrote the opinion for the Court holding that this statute violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. His opinion was
joined in part byJustices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg,
with Justice Stevens writing a separate concurrence joined by Justices
Blackmun and Ginsburg. Although Justice Kennedy did not join the
Souter opinion, he wrote a concurrence in which he also concluded that
the statute violated the Establishment Clause. Hence, the Court
concluded that the Establishment Clause was violated by a 6-3 vote.
The Stevens concurrence tried to articulate the line between
accommodation of religion and establishment of religion:
Affirmative state action in aid of segregation of this character is unlike
the evenhanded distribution of a public benefit or service, a "release
time" program for public school students involving no public premises
or funds, or a decision to grant an exemption from a burdensome
35. Id. at710-33.
36. AsJustice O'Connor explained in her concurrence in Caldor.
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation, would value the benefit which the
statute bestows on Sabbath observers--the right to select the day of the week in which to
refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this valued and
desirable benefit only on those employees who adhere to a particular religious belief. The
statute singles out Sabbath observers for special and, as the Court concludes, absolute
protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and
practices ofother private employees. There can be little doubt that an objective observer
or the public at large would perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court does today.
The message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the
detriment of those who do not share it. As such, the Connecticut statute has the effect of
advancing religion, and cannot withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
Id. at 711 (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (citation omitted).
37. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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general rule. It is, I believe, fairly characterized as establishing, rather
than merely accommodating, religion."
Justice Stevens noted the problematic nature of a governmental entity
offering a service to a religious entity that would not be offered to
others." Thus, he found that because the government crossed the line
of neutrality towards religion, its conduct violated the Establishment
Clause. He specifically acknowledged that the Establishment Clause
serves as a ceiling to the accommodations that can be rendered pursuant
to the Free Exercise Clause.' Justice Ginsburgjoined this concurrence,
presumably signaling that she agreed with his sense of the balance
between these two constitutional clauses.+[
Juxtaposed against these two recent cases which found an Establish-
ment Clause violation was the case of Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos42 in which the Court
upheld Title VII's exemption for religious entities.43 The Amos decision
is admittedly difficult to square with the Court'sjurisprudence requiring
religious exemptions to be less than absolute. The case may reflect the
Court's traditional reluctance to upset rules created in the civil rights
context, as reflected in the Katzenbach decision. More reflective of the
Court's overall Establishment Clause jurisprudence, however, may be
its decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison' in which it narrowly
construed Title VII's religious accommodation principle, thereby
avoiding an Establishment Clause problem. Thus, the Court employed
tools of statutory construction in Hardison to avoid having to conclude
that Congress crossed the line from protecting religious freedom to
violating the Establishment Clause. That cautious course allowed it to
continue to avoid invalidating an aspect of one of Congress's civil rights
laws. The Establishment Clause jurisprudence was therefore in a state
of uncertainty when Congress enacted RFRA and should have, at the
very least, given Congress pause when it drafted the legislation.
Thus, Congress enacted RFRA at a time when it presumed it had
broad authority to do so under Section 5. Nonetheless, a close
examination of recent Court cases should have revealed that it needed
to proceed cautiously if it sought to use Section 5 to protect religious
freedom as opposed to equal protection principles in the race context.
38. Id. at 711-12 (Stevens,J, concurring).
39. I. (Stevens,J., concurring).
40. Id. (Stevcns,J., concurring).
41. See id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
42. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
43. Id. at 330, 339.
44. 432 U.S, 63, 80-81 (1977).
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Moreover, a crystal ball would have revealed that the Court was
becoming less deferential to Congress in assessing the constitutionality
of its actions.' 5
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not enacted by a
Congress that was moving cautiously in applying Section 5 jurispru-
dence to the religious freedom context. RFRA prohibited the govern-
ment from "substantially burdening" a person's exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the
government can demonstrate the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 6 Although this
statute did not absolutely exempt religious entities from neutral rules of
general applicability, it did impose the highest possible burden of
justification, "strict scrutiny," on a governmental entity when such a rule
substantially burdened the exercise of religion.
Congress enacted RFRA in response to a previous decision of the
Court, Employment Division v. Smith,4 7 in which the Court held that
neutral, generally applicable laws that do not support a compelling state
interest may be applied to religious entities even when such laws
interfere with the exercise of religion.48 Congress desired to strengthen
the rights of religious entities to be exempted from neutral laws so that
they could practice their religion without state interference. Although
the principles enunciated in Marbugy v. Madison prohibit Congress from
overturning constitutional interpretations by the Court through a
legislative act,49  Congress may strengthen .existing constitutional
45. For further discussion of the crystal ball problem, see Colker & Brudney, supra note 26.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
47. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, a law of general applicability was applied to members of the
Native American Church who had lost theirjobs because they had used peyote for sacramental purposes.
Under state law, unemployment benefits were not available to individuals who lost theirjobs as a result of
criminal activity. Id. at 874. Because peyote use was unlawful, application ofthat general, neutral standard
resulted in the loss of unemployment benefits. The Court held that the state did not have to justify its
application of this neutral law to members of the Native American Church under a compelling interest
standard. Id. at 882-890. Four members of the Court disagreed with the appropriate legal standard. Id.
at 894. They argued that a compelling interest standard was appropriate if the law placed a substantial
burden on the religious practices of individuals. Id. at 905-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 909
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found that Oregon had satisfied that test, id. at 905, while
Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall could see no compelling interest in justifying the law's
application to the church. Id. at 909-21,
48. Id. at 885.
49. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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protections under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting
enforcement legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3' Thus, through RFRA, Congress sought to use its
Section 5 enforcement authority to strengthen the rights of religious
entities to be able to exercise their religious beliefs without government
interference. As in the voting rights area, Congress made conduct
unlawful that would not have been unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment and justified that expansion under Katzenbach's
"ratchet up" theory.
In 1996, the Archbishop of San Antonio brought suit under RFRA
challenging the denial of a building permit which he needed to enlarge
his church.5  The building permit was denied through the neutral
application of a law of general applicability-the city's historic
landmark ordinance. The Archbishop sought to be exempted from the
city ordinance through application of RFRA. The city refused to
consider the exemption, arguing that RFRA was unconstitutional. The
district court agreed with the city's argument, finding that Congress
exceeded its enforcement authority under Section 5 by enacting RFRA,
but it was reversed on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that
RFRA was unconstitutional. 52
Under RFRA, the city of San Antonio was required to justify its
application of the historic landmark ordinance under a compelling
interest standard which was a more rigorous standard than would have
applied under the Constitution. Had it been enforced in Ci- of Boerne,
RFRA may have resulted in the Archbishop receiving permission to
enlarge his church even though other, similar buildings that were being
used for secular purposes in the city could not have been altered
pursuant to the historical landmark ordinance. Because of the high
burden of justification imposed on the governmental entity under
RFRA, one could imagine that many religious entities would be excused
from laws of general applicability that burdened their religious exercise.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was a clumsy attempt by
Congress to use its Section 5 authority and thereby easily failed to meet
the minimum standards set forth in Marbuy v. Madison. Many members
of Congress who supported this legislation apparently thought that
Congress could "overturn" a constitutional law decision by the Court by
"restoring" an earlier decision of the Court. This misunderstanding was
50. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966).
51. Flores v. City ofBoerne, 877 F. Supp 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
52. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
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enunciated in the "Purposes" section of the statute in which Congress
stated that one of the purposes of the Act was "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . .. ."" It was also reflected
in the title of the bill-the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Although
Representative Henry Hyde, a chief sponsor of the legislation,
understood that "the label restoration is inappropriate in this context
since the Congress writes laws--it does not and cannot overrule the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, ' ' 4 the "restoration"
language was used in the "Purposes" section and title of RFRA.
Congress's arrogance in articulating an unconstitutional purpose invited
the Court to overturn the legislation irrespective of how carefully its
substantive portions were drafted. A reading of the title and "Purposes"
section could have been the beginning and ending of the Court's
opinion. It is hard to imagine a more direct attempt by Congress to
exceed its constitutional authority.
Even if Congress had acted less arrogantly in announcing its title and
purpose, it should have done a betterjob of understanding the scope of
its authority in the area of religion. Congress gave no consideration to
the arguably special scope of its authority under Section 5 when it
sought to enforce religious freedom rather than equal protection.
Furthermore, Congress had reason to be on notice that too vigorous
accommodation of religion can violate the Establishment Clause.
Although the compelling state interest standard did not constitute an
absolute preference for religious entities, it did pose the problem of
possibly providing undue preferential treatment to religious entities
without balancing other interests in order to avoid an establishment of
religion problem. Hence, the "ratchet up" theory from Katzenbach posed
special problems in the religious freedom context, because Congress
could bump up against the establishment of religion in its attempt to
protect religious exercise.55
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994). Professors Eisgruber and Sager argue that Congress did not
actually "restore" these legal standards because RFRA embodied a more stringent test than the Court had
in fact employed prior to the Smith decision. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6. The question of whether
Congress misstated these prior legal decisions is not relevant to my argument in this essay.
54. 139 CONG. REC. H2358 (May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
55. I do not mean to suggest that it was obvious at the time that RFRA was unconstitutional. The
City of Boeme decision was part of a series ofdecisions in which the Court modified existing precedent in
what Professor Law characterizes as a new federalism and which I characterize as a separation of powers
revival. It is not fair to criticize Congress or the liberal members ofthe Court for not foreseeing that revival.
Interestingly, two constitutional law scholars who argued after RFRA was enacted that it was
unconstitutional did not foresee the Court's decision in Lopez. E.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 6, at 460
n.80 ("To be sure, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that Congress had intruded
impermissibly upon state authority when it prohibited persons from carryingguns within ive-hundred feet
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In reviewing RFRA, the HouseJudiciary Committee simply assumed
that the "ratchet up" theory from Katzenbach could be routinely applied
to the Free Exercise Clause without giving consideration to the tension
between religious accommodation and the establishment of religion.56
Although its report did generally acknowledge that Congress could not
"create a statutory right prohibited by some other provision of the
Constitution," 57 it did not apply that constitutional principle to RFRA.
Instead, the Committee made no specific inquiry as to whether RFRA
might be inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
The Senate report recognized that Congress did not have the power
to overrule a constitutional decision but was also conclusory in its
analysis of why RFRA fell under its Section 5 authority.58 Unlike the
of a school. We believe the Court should, and likely will reverse the decision of the court of appeals.")
(citation omitted).
Hence, it may have been entirely reasonable for Congress to assume that there would be a
straight line of constitutionality from Katenbach to Ciy ofBoerne. Given the longstanding tradition of the
Court deferring to Congress's judgment in enforcing Section 5, 1 acknowledge that Congress had little or
no reason to recognize that that period of deference was coming to an end. Nonetheless, I am suggesting
that the votes of Justice Stevens and Ginsburg in Ciy of Berne suggest that RFRA could be found
unconstitutional without the Court upsetting the prior understanding of the deferential relationship
between Congress and the Court, because Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have not joined subsequent
opinions in which the Court has displayed less deference for Congress's work. For further discussion of this
historical progression of growing disrespect for Congress by the Court, see Colker & Brudney, supra note
26.
56. The report from the HouseJudiciary Committee stated:
Finally, the Committee believes that Congress has the constitutional authority to enact H.R.
1308. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper
Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislative branch has been
given the authority to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value when the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to assert its authority. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld such congressional action after declining to find a constitutional
protection itself. However, limits to congressional authority do exist. Congress may not (1)
create a statutory right prohibited by some other provision of the Constitution, (2) remove
rights granted by the Constitution, or (3) create a right inconsistent with an objective of a
constitutional provision. Because H.R. 1308 is well within these limits, the Committee
believes that in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress appropriately
creates a statutory right within the perimeter of its power.
H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Thomburgh v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)).
57. Id.
58. The Senate Report stated:
[C]ongressional power under section 5 to enforce the 14th amendment includes
congressional power to enforce the free exercise clause. Because the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is clearly designed to implement the free exercise clause-to protect
religious liberty and to eliminate laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion-it falls
squarely within Congress' section 5 enforcement power.
While the act is intended to enforce the right guaranteed by the free exercise clause
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House report, however, the Senate report did not even acknowledge
that enforcement legislation must not run afoul of other constitutional
rights. Its analysis simply did not contemplate the Establishment Clause
as having a role in defining Congress's authority under the Free Exercise
Clause.
This clumsy analysis may be a product of RFRA's enormous
popularity in Congress.5 9 Although Congress held hearings on RFRA
and its constitutionality, only one scholar cautioned Congress that
RFRA might suffer from constitutional problems. Professor Ira Lupu
testified on May 14, 1992, that the question of whether RFRA could be
justified under Section 5 was a close one.6" His testimony, however, was
buried at the end of a lengthy hearing and appears to have received little
consideration by Congress. Instead, Congress appears to have primarily
relied on the testimony of Professor Douglas Laycock, who later
of the first amendment, it does not purport to legislate the standard of review to be applied
by the Federal courts in cases brought under that constitutional provision. Instead, it creates
a new statutory prohibition on governmental action that substantially burdens the free
exercise of religion, except where such action is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest.
S. REP. No. 103-111, at 14 n.43 (1993).
59. RFRA passed the House by a voice vote on May 11, 1993. 139 CONG. REC. H2356 (1993).
The Senate adopted the House version with some amendments and that version passed by a vote of 97-3
on October 27, 1993. 139 CONG. REC. S14,461, S14,471 (1993). The House then approved the Senate
version by motion, again with no recorded roll call vote on November 3, 1993. 139 CONG. REC. H8713
(1993).
60. Professor Lupu stated:
I think the question is much closer and more difficult than [Professor Laycock] ... suggests.
The leading precedent for an expansive view of congressional power, Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), was the product of a Court far more attuned to the expansion
of rights and far less concerned with insulating the states from federal power than is the
current Court.
KLatzenbach, and other decisions on which Professor aycock relied, involve statutory
extensions of voting rights or other anti-discrimination concerns to circumstances beyond
those which the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional. In all of these matters, however,
the Congress had legislated in a general direction consistent with that taken by the courts.
Respected opinions in the leading cases on this subject take the view that Congress can act
to outlaw state practices inconsistent with judge-made principles, but cannot refashion
judge-made law whole cloth. Oregon v. Michell, 400 U.S. 112, 204-09, 294-96 (1970)
(Congress lacks power to extend the franchise in state elections to persons under 21 years
of age) (opinions ofJustice Harlan and Stewart). The limits suggested by the Supreme
Court's decisions concerning congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
present significant impediments to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.... [lilt is hard
to see on what basis Congress can substitute a stringent religion-protective doctrine for the
Court's new hands-off approach to the Free Exercise Clause. To do so would be to reject
the Court's direction and result, and to substitute a highly general and expansive doctrine
of religious freedom for a much narrower one chosen by the Court.
Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcom. on Ciil and Constudtional Rights of the Comm. on the judiciny, 102d
Cong. 389-91 (1992).
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unsuccessfully defended RFRA before the Supreme Court.61 Professor
Laycock offered strong testimony supporting RFRA's constitutionality.
He acknowledged that Congress may not dilute other powers found in
the Bill of Rights or override other express allocations of power in the
Constitution through enforcement of Section 5 .2 However, in his first
testimony before Congress, when RFRA was introduced in 1990, he did
not mention the Establishment Clause problem at all." When he
testified on the bill two years later, he made brief reference to a possible
Establishment Clause challenge, but cited Corporation ofthe Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos to support the
argument that the legislation did not create an Establishment Clause
problem.64 In addition, Professor-Laycock made no attempt to reconcile
Amos with other decisions in which the Court had found an Establish-
ment Clause problem.65 He saw a relatively straight line from the
Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan to the constitutionality of RFRA
and took little pause to consider the particular problems that exist when
Congress seeks to enforce the Free Exercise Clause due to the tensions
that exist between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.66
III. Crrr OFBOERNE DECISION
Congress's rush to enact RFRA and its misunderstanding of the scope
of its authority to overturn prior constitutional law decisions ran into a
fatal collision with the Supreme Court in City of Boerne. Although three
members of the Court dissented from the conclusion that RFRA was
61. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Chiiland ConstitutionalRights ofthe Committee on theJudiciay, 102d
Cong. 330-59 (1992) ((statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, The University of Texas); The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act" Hearing on S. 2969 Before 11e Comm. on theJudicay, 102d Cong. 92-97 (1992)
(statement of Douglas Laycock).
62. See Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Ciil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciy, 102d Cong. 355 (1992) (statement of Douglas Laycock).
63. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Jwicimy, 101st Cong. 72-79 (1990).
64. See Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rig/ts of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 355 (1992); The Re/iius Freedom Restoration Ack Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Comm. on
thej7udicia,, 102d Cong. 76-97 (1992) (statement of Douglas Layeock).
65. See Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
judicia,, 102d Cong. 355 (1992) (statement of Douglas Laycock).
66. Nonetheless, two law review articles were published shortly after RFRA was enacted which
argued that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. E.g., Idleman, supra note 10, at 285-302; Eisgruber
& Sager, supra note 6. These articles were both cited in Petitioner's brief to the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne, so the Supreme Court was made aware of the special problems that exist when Section 5 is applied
to the religion context. See Petitioner's Brief at 47, City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-
2074), available at 1996 WL689630. Neitherofthese articles, nor the Petitioner's brief, however, interwove
the Establishment Clause problem with the Section 5 analysis, as I have suggested in this article.
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unconstitutional, the entire Court implicitly recognized that RFRA
raised problems under Marbugy v. Madison. 7 The dissenters concluded
that the prior Smith decision should be overturned by the Court and
therefore the Court should permit Congress to enforce the Smith
standard through RFRA.68 No member of the Court concluded that
Congress had the authority to "restore" the Smith decision as a proper
interpretation of the First Amendment. The Court therefore interpreted
RFRA in its most arrogant light-that Congress was deliberately
flouting Marbuy in announcing the proper interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause.
69
The City of Boerne Court, however, did not merely conclude that
RFRA violated the basic principles enunciated in Marbugy v. Madison
regarding which institution gets to interpret the Constitution. It also
denounced the language in Katzenbach v. Morgan "which could be
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation
that expands the rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."7  The Court then crafted a "proportionality and
congruence" test to replace)Katzenbach's "dilution" test. Under this new
standard, legislation could be unconstitutional under Section 5 even if
it did not conflict with another constitutional provision. While it was
still constitutional, for example, for Congress to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause by prohibiting certain literacy requirements under the
Voting Rights Act, RFRA was unconstitutional because of "a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the
legitimate end to be achieved."7 This new standard for Section 5
jurisprudence went well beyond the Katzenbach dilution test, and it later
resulted in the Court invalidating the private damage remedies created
against state actors in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act even
though Congress was not being so arrogaht in that context as to
overturn a prior constitutional holding.72
Although the "Purposes" section of RFRA and the Act's title appear
to reflect Congress's arrogance in violating Marbugy, the substantive
section announcing the rule of law as well as the committee reports
explaining the authority for the statute offer a different view. One could
understand Congress as merely using its statutory authority to raise the
level of protection in the free exercise area while leaving the constitu-
67. See 521 U.S. 507, 527-29 (1997).
68. Id. at 546-66.
69. Id. at 516.
70. Id. at 527-28.
71. Id. at 533.
72. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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tional standard unchanged for all actions not covered by this statute.
Under that view, then, the legal question would be whether Congress
raised the bar so high that it conflicted with the Establishment Clause,
not whether it inherently violated the Constitution by attempting to
"restore" the law of the First Amendment to an earlier interpretation.
This mode of analysis would have been entirely consistent with the
Court's earlier opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan.73 In Katzenbach, the
Voting Rights provision at issue, like RFRA, sought to create rights
beyond the legal standard created by the Court in an earlier constitu-
tional law decision.7' In that case, the Court held that Congress could
enact enforcement legislation under its Section 5 powers so long as it did
not act in a way that was inconsistent with the "letter and spirit of the
constitution" and did not "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" existing
constitutional guarantees.
73
No member of the Court sought to measure the constitutionality of
RFRA against the dilution standard from Katzenbach. Instead, they each
accepted an interpretation of RFRA under which Congress was directly
violating Marbuy v. Madison by changing the constitutional standard.
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion provides us with a
hint of how such an analysis might have proceeded. In a brief concur-
ring opinion, he asserts that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause:
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a
museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible
for an exemption from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement
of the structure. Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic
Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its owner a federal statutory
entitlement to an exemption from a generally applicable, neutral civil
law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under the statute or
not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no
atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for
religion, as opposed toirreligion, is forbidden by the First Amend-
ment.76
Justice Stevens's assessment, however, was inadequate because he did
not recognize the relationship between the First Amendment and
73. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
74. Despite the Court's holding in Lassiter v. Northampton County BoardofElections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1959), that the North Carolina English literacy requirement did not violate Section 1 of the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments, Congress enacted section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which made it
unlawful for New York City to impose an English literacy requirement on voters who had been educated
in Puerto Rico. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1994).
75. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.




Section 5. Justice Stevens's First Amendment observation is directly
relevant to a proper Section 5 analysis because an important Section 5
principle is that Congress may not violate another constitutional
principle when it enforces the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately,
Justice Stevens's opinion does not attempt to interweave his First
Amendment Establishment Clause concern into his Section 5 analysis.
In addition, no member of the Court joined his opinion, leaving five
members of the Court (includingJustice Ginsburg) as entirely joining the
majority's Section 5 analysis in City ofBoerne. If the liberals on the Court
were to join the holding to strike down RFRA as exceeding Congress's
constitutional authority, a more cautious holding was clearly available.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens could have noted that special tensions
exist when Congress tries to enforce the Free Exercise Clause that do
not exist under the Equal Protection Clause, because of the peculiar role
of the Establishment Clause. Hence, they could have found that
although the "ratchet up" theory from Katzenbach is good law when
Congress seeks to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, it does not
directly apply when Congress seeks to enforce the Free Exercise Clause,
because the Establishment Clause serves as a limitation on Congress's
authority.
Consistent with their decisions in Board ofEducation ofKz-yas Joel Village
SchoolDistrict v. Grumet and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg could have concluded that RFRA constituted an
unconstitutional use of Section 5 because Congress did not properly
strike the balance between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses." This type ofcautious decision would have been far preferable
to joining the majority decision in Ci4, of Boerne, because it would have
prevented the liberal members of the Court from joining an opinion
which set the stage for restricting the scope of Congress's authority in
enacting civil rights legislation.
That type of cautious argument, however, was not offered by any of
the litigants or amicus who participated in the case.78 When lawyer
Jeffrey Sutton, who argued the case as amicus curiae for petitioner, was
asked whether he was relying on the argument that RFRA violates the
Establishment Clause, he replied that he was not and that he hoped the
77. Nonetheless, they would have had to distinguish those two cases from their opinions in
Corporation of*Presiding Bishop oftth Church ofjesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) and
City ofBoerne. InAmos, the Court upheld the religious exemption to Title VII's prohibition against religious
discrimination in employment to secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations. 483 U.S. at 338.
78. Legal academics, however, did argue that RFRAviolated the Establishment Clause, shortly after
the statute was enacted. See William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act" Establishmen Equal
Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 227(1995); Idleman, supra note 10; Eisgruber& Sager,
supra note 6.
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Court would reject such an argument (even though the Establishment
Clause argument was made in Petitioner's brie). 79 He recognized that
the Establishment Clause serves as a "ceiling" in the free exercise area
but argued that RFRA was under that ceiling (although it suffered from
other constitutional infirmities). In a legal environment in which no one
pressed the Establishment Clause argument, it may have been difficult
to expect the Court to craft its own establishment theory.
Professor Law offers us another hint as to why Justice Ginsburg may
not have pursued the path of writing a separate, concurring opinion in
City ofBoerne. Law observed in her oral remarks for this symposium that
Justice Ginsburg criticized the multiplicity of opinions in many Supreme
Court cases in an article she wrote before being elevated to the Supreme
Court."0 Justice Ginsburg argued that "overindulgence" in separate
opinions harms the colleagiality of the Court.8 I would argue, however,
that it is more important to develop a coherent understanding of an area
of law than to further the collegiality of the Court. Now that Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens have begun to dissent from the Court's applica-
tion of City of Boerne in the civil rights context, they have an opportunity
to revisit their analysis in Cit , of Boerne. They can begin to develop a
coherent Section 5 jurisprudence which recognizes that the holding in
City ofBoerne is consistent with their understanding of the Establishment
Clause but not reflective of their understanding of how those principles
apply to the civil rights context.
IV. THE FUTURE?
Congress has recently enacted new legislation to protect religious
freedom which presents many of the same problems reflected in RFRA.
This statute, entitled the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, is a somewhat more narrow version of RFRA. Rather than
create the compelling interest test for all governmentally created neutral
rules that substantially burden religious exercise, this statute only
provides relief when a land use regulation'creates such a burden. 2 As
with RFRA, the committee report justifies this language as being valid
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 It tries to justify the
provision as constitutional enforcement language based on the testimony
79. See Supreme Court Transcript, City of Boerne %,. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (No. 95-2074), availabk
at 1997 WL 87109, at *31-32.
80. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REx'. 1185, 1191 (1992).
81. Id.
82. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
83. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 17-18 (1999).
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that Congress collected on how land use regulations can substantially
burden religious exercise.84 Nonetheless, the statute leaves in place the
strict scrutiny test found in RFRA which, as I have argued above, is of
doubtful constitutional validity in light of Establishment Clause
problems.
Unlike RFRA, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act did not sail through Congress with virtual unanimity. Two reports
with dissenting views were authored by members of the HouseJudiciary
Committee when the bill was considered by that chamber. The bill was
passed by unanimous consent in the Senate so there is no record of the
vote, but it was passed by a vote of 306 to 118 with 10 members not
voting in the House. Although 199 of 222 Republicans voted for the
bill, only 107 of 211 Democrats voted for it.86 Congress glossed over
any constitutional problems with the bill, but constitutional challenges
can be expected.87 Rather than stand on the sidelines, liberal organiza-
tions may want to participate in arguing that the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act is unconstitutional.8 The challenge
will be to make the constitutional argument in such a way that does not
do further damage to Congress's Section 5 authority to enact civil rights
legislation. As I have suggested above, liberal organizations should
argue that Section 5 jurisprudence is distinct in the religious freedom
context. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is
unconstitutional not because it violates CiQy of Boerne's proportionality
and congruence test, but because it violates the Establishment Clause in
its attempt to protect religious freedom. Such clumsy and overinclusive
efforts to protect religious freedom should not have an impact on
liberals' attempts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. The
Katzenbach "ratchet up" theory can still have vitality if Ciy of Boerne is
confined to the religious freedom context.
84. Id. at 17.
85. See 145 CONG. REC. H5608 (daily edJuly 15, 1999).
86. Id.
87. There have been a number of cases upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act. See, e.g., Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Township of Middletown, No. Civ.
A. 01-5345, 2002 WL 927804 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2002); Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.
2001); Gerhardt v. Lizaroff, No. C2-95-517 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2002). In Freedom Baptist Church, the court
considered but rejected an Establishment Clause argument, noting that only Justice Stevens decided Ciy
ofBoeme on that basis. See Freedom Baptist Church, 2002 WL 927804 at *6.
88. The American Civil Liberties Union opposed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act because it was concerned that it might be used by religious organizations to undermine
enforcement ofcivil rights laws. That same concern was expressed by the minority members ofthe House
Judiciary Committee who opposed the bill. See supra note 83. The opponents of the bill, however, did not
raise Establishment Clause concerns.
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